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This study uses restatements to reveal the poor quality of
past accounting information reported within China’s capital
market. We show that up to a quarter of listed ﬁrms in
mainland China explicitly admitted the poor quality of their
ﬁnancial information by restating their previous ﬁnancial
reports between 1999 and 2005. Many of these ﬁrms man-
aged their earnings mainly via below-the-line items to
avoid losses and promote survival, rather than to support
reﬁnancing goals. Such poor-quality ﬁnancial reporting is
more likely among ﬁrms that have weaker proﬁtability
and a shareholder base that is state-controlled, with dif-
fused ownership and a relatively low proportion of shares
held by institutional investors. Furthermore, we ﬁnd the
market to be relatively insensitive to such admissions.
Investors’ reactions capture only the earnings information
of the current reported year, rather than also reﬂecting
the concurrently revealed correction of past ﬁnancialhina Journal of Accounting Research. Founded by Sun Yat-sen University and City
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ignore the earnings information. Investors’ reliance on
earnings is merely low relative to the mature US market.
These ﬁndings demonstrate that accounting credibility in
China has low value; providing poor-quality ﬁnancial infor-
mation bears little cost because various market mecha-
nisms fail to deter such behavior. Nevertheless, regulators’
ongoing efforts to enhance the quality of ﬁnancial informa-
tion and disclosure among listed ﬁrms are still fruitful. The
frequency of restatements decreased over our sample per-
iod, which reinforces the current regulatory prospects and
strategies for further improving China’s capital markets.
 2011 China Journal of Accounting Research. Founded by
Sun Yat-sen University and City University of Hong Kong.
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Efﬁcient capital markets reward high-quality ﬁnancial reporting, which facilitates the
efﬁcient raising and allocation of corporate capital and thus creates beneﬁts for investors.
In the past decade, China’s stock market has become very popular among domestic inves-
tors, as the stock market is one of a very limited number of investment vehicles open to
them. The total market value of equity invested in the Chinese stock market grew by an
order of magnitude during the 1999–2007 period.2 In less than three years, from mid-
2005 to late-2007, the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange Composite Index experienced
a sixfold increase, after a decade of quietness. These gains generated euphoria among inves-
tors, at least until the stock market started to correct by as much as 70% a year from the end
of 2007. This rise and fall of the stock market highlighted general concerns over the quality of
ﬁnancial reporting in China.
The negatively perceived turn of events in the Chinese market appears to parallel that of
the US market during the same period. It is noted that an increasing number of US ﬁrms in
recent years have had to restate their previous years’ ﬁnancial reports, either voluntarily or
when forced to do so by regulators (Scholz, 2008; Wu, 2002). The number of ﬁrms restat-
ing their previous ﬁnancial reports reached almost 300 in 2005, amounting to roughly two
percent of all public companies in the United States. This number was high enough to
draw appreciable attention from the media, regulators and academics. In mainland China,
a similar yet more pronounced phenomenon recently emerged. We ﬁnd that a signiﬁcant
proportion of listed companies on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges restated
their annual reports for the years from 1999 to 2005. Interestingly, in contrast to the enor-
mous publicity received by US earnings restatements, in China restatements have received
scant coverage in the Chinese media, despite the problem being more pronounced.
Restatements represent clear-cut violations of accounting rules and hence an explicit
admission of the poor quality of companies’ past ﬁnancial reporting. Research shows thatimately USD99.2 billion at USD1 = CNY8.2768) by the end of 1999 to 8555 billion
the USD1 = CNY7.30) by the end of 2007.
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severe decline in the stock price, thus harshly penalizing the restatement ﬁrm (Palmrose
et al., 2004; Wu, 2002; Turner et al., 2001). US research also ﬁnds that after a restatement,
the market relies less on earnings information to determine a ﬁrm’s stock price, reﬂecting
investors’ loss of conﬁdence in the company’s ﬁnancial reports (Wu, 2002; Andersen and
Yohn, 2002), and the company is forced to pay a higher cost for equity capital (Hribar and
Jenkins, 2004). These effects reﬂect the damage to the credibility of a ﬁrm’s future ﬁnancial
reports in the wake of previously released low-quality ﬁnancial information. In an emerg-
ing market such as China, however, it is highly uncertain whether the same market reac-
tion exists, because investors’ conﬁdence in ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial reports may be low at the
outset. The question also arises whether earnings restatements will reduce investors’ reli-
ance on accounting earnings for setting stock prices, or increase the ﬁrm’s cost of equity
capital, as found in the US research. Furthermore, it is possible that many of the restate-
ments in China could be the result of opportunistic behavior, although with different moti-
vations than in the United States, given the different institutional setting. Thus, China’s
restatements provide an opportunity to examine the value ascribed by an emerging mar-
ket to the quality and credibility of ﬁnancial reports, relative to the value assigned by a
mature market.
Our ﬁrst objective in this paper is to explore the characteristics of poor-quality ﬁrms—
deﬁned as ﬁrms that issue restatements—relative to control ﬁrms. We also investigate the
incentives to report poor-quality ﬁnancial information previously released by such ﬁrms.
In addition, we examine the consequences, in terms of the stock market reaction, of admit-
ting the publication of such information. Finally, we rationalize why Chinese companies so
frequently provide poor-quality ﬁnancial reporting, only to subsequently correct it. We
hope this study will offer insights to regulators on how to detect poor-quality companies
and suggest aspects that may improve the quality of listed ﬁrms. As with many other stud-
ies on issues concerning mainland China, this study also aims to remind readers that the
regulatory and ﬁnancial reporting environment is vastly different in China, as are the moti-
vations and consequences for ﬁrms and for the market as a whole.
This study offers academic researchers, regulators and investors—both domestic and
international—insights into the overall quality of China’s accounting information and a
further understanding of China’s increasingly important capital markets. This is perhaps
the ﬁrst empirical study that directly examines the issue of accounting quality in Chi-
na—a nation whose capital markets are becoming increasingly important and hence can-
not be ignored in the global capital market. This study complements the broad research
literatures on China, earnings quality and restatements.
Previous literature (Wu, 2002; Anderson and Yohn, 2002) on the US market argues that
earnings restatements are indicators of the poor quality of prior ﬁnancial reporting. Poor
accounting quality is generally penalized by the capital market, and such penalties serve as
a deterrent to companies’ delivery of poor accounting quality via accounting manipulation
and similar means. The results of our study imply that such penalties do not yet exist in
China. Along with the Ministry of Finance (MOF), which sets accounting standards, China’s
regulatory body, the Chinese Securities and Regulatory Commission (CSRC), has been mak-
ing efforts since 1996 to enhance the regulatory environment of the nation’s capital mar-
ket. Accounting regulation is an important part of this process and there have been
signiﬁcant and gradual economic improvements since 1978. Meanwhile, we also realize
that such efforts must be persistently carried into the future. For example, our study shows
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distinguish between good and poor accounting quality. Hence, our study also suggests the
establishment of an effective penalty system through government regulation, which ap-
pears to be a necessary step for China’s emerging market to become a complete capital
market.
Following this introduction, the paper consists of six sections. Section 2 offers a detailed,
topic-relevant background to China’s accounting and regulatory environment. Section 3
conducts a literature review on restatements and other related areas. Section 4 develops
our hypotheses and outlines the empirical models. Section 5 describes the details of
restatements in China. Section 6 provides the empirical tests and interprets the results.
Section 7 concludes.2. Accounting standards and regulatory background in China
The securities regulator in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is the CSRC, which is
equivalent to the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Established in October
1992, the CSRC is an institution of the PRC State Council and is authorized to regulate Chi-
na’s securities and futures markets. Although it did not issue its ﬁrst version of Procedure
for Inspecting Listed Companies until December 21, 1996 (the 1996 Procedure), it became
effective immediately. The Procedure covered the scope and procedures, and the CSRC’s
responsibilities during inspections. The scope emphasized the truthfulness, completeness,
accuracy and timeliness of disclosures by listed companies.
In the 1990s, companies followed the old PRC accounting standards, which failed to
specify how to deal with accounting errors and irregularities. Accounting treatments
therefore varied widely among companies and across industries. China’s accounting re-
form of the late 1990s introduced the ﬁrst accounting standard: The Standard of Changes
in Accounting Policies and Estimates, and Corrections of Material Accounting Errors3 (the
1999 Standard). It was issued in June 1998 by the MOF, PRC’s accounting standard setter
and came into effect on January 1, 1999. Section 3 of the 1999 Standard described the restate-
ment methods and required disclosure of the reason(s) for and total amount of the restate-
ment. The 1999 Standard was modiﬁed slightly in January 2001, with one item added: Any
abuse of changes in accounting policies or accounting estimates will be treated as material
accounting mistakes and therefore restated. The 1999 Standard only required a restatement
to be disclosed in the company’s forthcoming annual report. For several years, the Account-
ing Standards of Business Enterprises (ASBE) were adopted in parallel with the Companies
Accounting System, which mentioned the correction of errors in its tenth chapter and pro-
vided technical treatments that were consistent with those of the Old Standard.
Issued in October 1999, the CSRC’s Notice on Improving Financial Information Disclosure of
Listed Companies (the 1999 Notice) states that: (1) listed companies should make proper
loss estimates of accounts receivable, inventories, investments, etc., and should not change
the method of provision and percentage of provision within the same reporting period at
the companies’ will and (2) listed companies should disclose any change in accounting
policies or estimates.
In 2001, there was still no rule that explicitly required listed companies to disclose
accounting irregularities or mistakes publicly in a timely fashion. Unlike the common3 This Standard was a chapter in the Accounting Standards of Business Enterprises (ASBE), which was completed in 2002; thus,
it is also called China’s 2002 ASBE.
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press remained largely silent. Hence, investors were ﬁrst informed of a restatement upon
the public release of a company’s annual report in major Chinese business newspapers and
the website4 designated by the CSRC.
Unlike the practices of US listed ﬁrms, in which a restatement will revise any affected
line items in all relevant quarter(s)’ and year(s)’ income statements and balance sheets,
restatements in China under the Old Standard are not required to tabulate the corrected
ﬁnancial statements of all affected years. In most cases, where only the ﬁnancial state-
ments of the previous year (t  1) are corrected, the corrected ﬁnancial statements will
be found in the current year’s (t) annual report for comparison purposes. If the corrected
year(s) reaches beyond the previous year (t  1), then the correction will not be made in
the earlier released reports, but will instead bypass the proﬁt and loss statement for year
t  1 and directly hit the corrected balance sheet. The overall cumulative effect would, of
course, be adjusted in the beginning balance of retained earnings and other affected items
on the balance sheet in the annual report of year t. Because of the subtle difference be-
tween the accounting treatments required by the US Generally Accepted Accounting Prin-
ciples (GAAP) and the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), we cautiously
call our event ‘‘restatements’’ rather than ‘‘earnings restatements’’ because not all the af-
fected earnings would be restated during the sample period, only the previous year’s earn-
ings. Note also that the Old Standard required the detailed reasons for and amount of the
restatement to be disclosed in the footnotes, but in practice such disclosures, especially
regarding the reasons for restatement, were generally rather brief and opaque.
On March 19, 2001, the CSRC issued the revised Procedure for Inspecting Listed Companies
(the 2001 Procedure), which superseded the original 1996 Procedure. With the new release
came a CSRC announcement that it would strengthen the inspection of listed companies’
ﬁnancial reports, corporate governance structures and independence from related parties.
The 2001 Procedure required companies to correct any irregularities found in the inspec-
tion and to disclose them publicly within 30 days of an ofﬁcial notice.
The two years following the release of the 2001 Procedurewitnessed a tremendous effort
by the CSRC, resulting in the issue of 19 chapters of Rules on Information Disclosure for
Listed Companies. Chapter 19: The Correction of Financial Information and its Disclosure
(Rule 19) was issued at the end of 2003. Rule 19 demands that listed companies immedi-
ately ﬁle an ofﬁcial report with the CSRC regarding any material events, including the cor-
rection of ﬁnancial statements, and submit a revised and audited annual report within
45 days if the most recent annual report is incorrect. However, due to a loophole, Rule
19 did not include a scenario for change-of-accounting estimates, and thus it had little real
effect on disclosure patterns. Because a change-of-accounting estimate was not deﬁned as
a material event, it did not require timely disclosure. Many companies intentionally mis-
classiﬁed the correction of mistakes as a change-of-accounting estimate and routinely dis-
closed them in the forthcoming annual report rather than providing an immediate
disclosure in the form of a change-of-accounting estimate.54 The CSRC designates the following four newspapers for listed companies to disclose their ﬁnancial information: China
Securities Journal, Shanghai Securities Journal, Securities Time, and Securities Daily. The CSRC-designated website is
www.cninfo.com.cn.
5 Note that a change-of-accounting estimate does not change past accounting numbers, only future ones. The true accounting
practice to ameliorate a false claim is, however, a restatement.
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the substantial number of companies that received a qualiﬁed auditor’s opinion and the
increased number of restatements in 2002, the CSRC issued the Notice on Further Improving
Financial Information Disclosure of Listed Companies (the 2004 Notice). By emphasizing the
1999 Notice, the 2004 Notice clearly states that listed companies should not abuse asset
impairments, change-of-accounting estimates or correction of material mistakes to
manipulate ﬁnancial results. Any company doing so would be held responsible. However,
the 2004 Notice did not specify the scope of responsibility that a company would bear for
committing a violation.
On February 15, 2006, the MOF announced that starting from 2007 annual reports, all
publicly traded companies would adopt the new Accounting Standards of Business Enter-
prises (2006 ASBE), representing a major convergence towards the IFRS. The 2006 ASBE,
Changes in Accounting Policies and Estimates and Corrections of Accounting Errors, fully
adopted the practices of the IFRS, which are consistent with US GAAP. That is, from
2007 annual reports and thereafter, a restatement will revise any affected line items in in-
come statements and balance sheets for all relevant quarter(s) and year(s).
Table 1 summarizes the development of accounting regulations related to this speciﬁc
issue.Table 1
Regulatory timeline.
Date of issuance Effective date Issuer Name of document Abbreviation
December 21, 1996 December 21, 1996 CSRC Procedure for Inspecting Listed
Companies
1996 Procedure
June 25, 1998 January 1, 1999 MOF ASBE: Changes in Accounting
Policies, Estimates and
Corrections of Material
Accounting Errors
The 1999 Standard
October 10, 1999 October 10, 1999 CSRC Notice on Improving Financial
Information Disclosure of Listed
Companies
1999 Notice
December 29, 2000 January 1, 2001 MOF Companies’ Accounting System
2001, Chapter 10: Accounting
Adjustment; Section 3:
Corrections of Accounting Errors
Accounting System
January 18, 2001 January 1, 2001 MOF ASBE: Changes in Accounting
Policies and Estimates and
Corrections of Material
Accounting Errors (Revised)
The 1999 Standard (revised)
March 19, 2001 March 19, 2001 CSRC Procedure for Inspecting Listed
Companies (Revised)
2001 Procedure
December 1, 2003 December 1, 2003 CSRC Rules on Information Disclosure
for Listed Companies #19: The
Correction of Financial
Information and its Disclosure
Rule 19
January 8, 2004 January 8, 2004 CSRC Notice on Further Improving
Financial Information Disclosure
of Listed Companies
2004 Notice
February 15, 2006 January 1, 2007 MOF New ASBE #28: Changes in
Accounting Policies, Estimates
and Corrections of Material
Accounting Errors
New Standard
Notes: CSRC: China’s Securities Regulatory Commission. MOF: Ministry of Finance, People’s Republic of China.
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3.1. Earnings restatements in the United States
Using a sample of 73 ﬁrms that corrected previously reported quarterly earnings, Kinney
and McDaniel (1989) ﬁnd that the sample ﬁrms were smaller and less proﬁtable, had a
higher level of debt and lower level of growth, and faced more serious uncertainties due
to the receipt of more qualiﬁed audit opinions. Analyzing 224 SEC accounting and auditing
enforcement releases between 1982 and 1989, Feroz et al. (1991) ﬁnd that the SEC most
often pursued overstatements of accounts receivable and inventories due to premature
revenue recognition and delayed write-offs. They also ﬁnd that the disclosure of these
reporting violations changed expectations of the target ﬁrm’s future earnings, as reﬂected
in ﬁnancial analysts’ reduced earnings estimates after the disclosures. DeFond and Jiam-
balvo (1991) examine 44 earnings restatements and ﬁnd that 41 of them involved over-
statement, consistent with an income-increasing motivation. They ﬁnd that earnings
overstatements are negatively correlated with growth in earnings and are more likely
when ﬁrms have diffuse ownership and few income-increasing GAAP alternatives avail-
able. They also ﬁnd that restating ﬁrms are less likely to have audit committees. Dechow
et al. (1995) ﬁnd that an important motivation for earnings manipulation is the desire to
attract external ﬁnancing at a lower cost. Firms that manipulate earnings are more likely
to have: (1) boards of directors dominated by management, (2) a CEO who simultaneously
serves as the chairman of the board, and (3) a CEO who is also the ﬁrm’s founder. In addi-
tion, these ﬁrms are less likely to have an audit committee and an outside blockholder.
Firms that manipulate earnings experience a signiﬁcant increase in their cost of capital
after the manipulation is made public.
Enron’s accounting scandal in 2001 and Worldcom’s in 2002 spawned a large volume of
research on earnings restatements. This research can be broadly classiﬁed into three cat-
egories: (1) descriptive and market reaction studies around restatement announcements,
(2) investigation of the motivations that lead to restatements, and (3) examination of the
consequences of restatements. In the ﬁrst category, Wu (2003) documents the character-
istics of more than 1200 US restatements announced between 1977 and 2001. She shows
that there has been a signiﬁcant increase in the number of restatements since the late
1990s and ﬁnds a signiﬁcant market reaction of more than 11% over a three-day win-
dow—a reaction that can be explained by both qualitative and quantitative information
carried in the restatement announcements. Concurrent research by Palmrose et al.
(2004) and Turner et al. (2001) also ﬁnd similar market reactions to the announcements.
Furthermore, Lev et al. (2008) ﬁnd that restatements that eliminate or shorten the history
of earnings growth or positive earnings have signiﬁcantly more adverse effects for investor
valuations and the likelihood of lawsuits than other restatements.
In the second category of studies, Richardson et al. (2003) suggest that capital market
pressures motivate restatement companies to adopt aggressive accounting policies; that
is, the typical restatement ﬁrm has been attempting to maintain a string of consecutive
quarters of positive earnings growth and consecutive positive quarterly earnings surprises.
In addition, top executives at these ﬁrms receive a larger portion of their compensation
from equity relative to leaders of non-restating ﬁrms. Richardson et al. (2003) also ﬁnd
the information in accruals to be a key indicator of the earnings manipulation that leads
to the restatements. Grifﬁn (2003) investigates the patterns of insider trading in restating
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to overstate earnings. Agrawal and Chadha (2005) ﬁnd that the incidence of independent
directors with a background in accounting or ﬁnance on the board or audit committee is
negatively related to the probability of restatements. However, unlike Burns and Kedia
(2006), they do not ﬁnd signiﬁcant deﬁciencies in other aspects of corporate governance.
In the third category, several studies explore the consequences of restatements. Wu
(2003) ﬁnds that the earnings response coefﬁcient (ERC) dropped dramatically following
restatement, which could be interpreted as a loss of conﬁdence among investors. Hribar
and Jenkins (2004) ﬁnd that accounting restatements lead to both decreases in expected
future earnings and increases in the ﬁrm’s cost of equity capital. Srinivasan (2005) shows
that outside directors, especially audit committee members, bear reputational costs for
failures in ﬁnancial reporting.3.2. Earnings management and restatements in China
China research often focuses on earnings management, which offers a rich background
for the restatement issue. Typical incentives that are found in the United States to manip-
ulate earnings are almost nonexistent in China. For example, demand for ﬁnancing, espe-
cially equity ﬁnancing, is huge in China, whereas incentives to meet or beat analysts’
expectations are minimal. The compensation plans of China’s listed companies are rarely
incentive-based, thus managers cannot manipulate earnings to inﬂate stock prices with in-
tent to beneﬁt their own compensation. Chinese companies also do not face pressure from
debt covenant constraints. Earnings management, nevertheless, usually occurs when com-
panies are conducting their IPOs. Aharony et al. (2000) suggest that state-owned enter-
prises in unprotected industries may manage accounting accruals to boost earnings and/
or list those business units with temporarily high proﬁts resulting from high accounting
accruals during the process of ﬁnancial packaging. Earnings management also takes place
when listed companies conduct secondary issuances or rights issuances. Given that listed
companies are required to achieve a minimum average return on equity (ROE) of 10% for
the three years prior to secondary issuances or rights issuances, and given the reality that
the CSRC has limited resources to monitor all applicants closely, Chen and Yuan (2004)
show that many ﬁrms were able to gain approval for rights issues through earnings man-
agement and subsequently performed worse than those that did not employ such prac-
tices. Thus, capital resources might have been better allocated had the regulators
examined the management of earnings more closely. Listed companies also massage
earnings to avoid consecutive losses, which would result in them being tagged with
‘‘special treatment’’6 (ST) (Lu, 1999) or, worse, ‘‘particular transfer’’7 (PT). In addition,6 Special Treatment (ST) has been adopted since April 22, 1998, as a signal for listed companies experiencing any of the
following abnormal ﬁnancial or other abnormal situations: (1) two consecutive years of losses; (2) stockholders’ equity falling
below the nominal value in the most recent year (in China, the nominal value per share is stipulated as 1 Yuan for all listed
companies); (3) independent auditor issuance of a qualiﬁed opinion or refusal of issuing opinion; (4) stockholders’ equity, net of
the auditor fee and unrecognized portion by concerned parties, falling below the nominal value by the end of the most recent
year; (5) two consecutive years of losses following the restatement of a previous year’s result in the most recent year’s annual
report; or (6) any ﬁnancial situation the CSRC deems abnormal. Other abnormal situations include discontinuation of operations
due to natural disaster or other signiﬁcant event, possible punitive and compensatory damages from lawsuits exceeding net
assets, etc. A cap of 5% of the stock price movement (increase or decrease) applies to ST stocks.
7 Particular Transfer (PT), effective since July 9, 1999, is designed for listed companies that experience three consecutive years
of losses. The daily trading will be suspended and substituted with once-a-week special transfers among investors. A cap of 5%
will be imposed on increasing stock prices, but no stop limit for declining price.
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items (Chen and Yuan, 2004). Finally, work by Wang and Zhang (2004) shows that an
increasing number of ﬁrms issued restatements between 1999 and 2002.
4. Hypotheses and empirical models
Having elaborated on China’s unique institutional background on companies’ incentives
to manipulate earnings in Section 3, we ﬁrst offer the following two hypotheses on the two
major incentives for Chinese companies. The ﬁrst addresses ﬁnancing needs, whereas the
second concerns survival.
Hypothesis 1. Restatement ﬁrms tend to be those with strong ﬁnancing incentives during
or before the restated year. Speciﬁcally, restatement ﬁrms tend to be those that offered
secondary or rights issues during or before the restated year.Hypothesis 2. Restatement ﬁrms tend to be those under delisting pressure during or
before the restated year.
Note that these two hypotheses cannot co-exist in the same ﬁrm, because the previously
mentioned 10% proﬁtability requirement for reﬁnancing is far above the break-even point,
and companies meeting this criterion are in little danger of delisting.
Next, we examine which factors collectively inﬂuence companies to issue restate-
ments in China’s A-share market. Our testing variables consist of three categories: cor-
porate governance, motivations and ﬁrm performance. The reform of Chinese state-
owned enterprises (SOE) has been relatively successful in solving short-term but not
long-term managerial incentive problems, and has also failed to adequately address
the issue of management selection. The latter problem arises from the fact that man-
agers of SOEs are selected by bureaucrats rather than capitalists. Bureaucrats have the
authority to select managers but do not need to bear the consequences of that selec-
tion. Thus, they have no proper incentives to ﬁnd and appoint high-caliber managers,
which negatively affects the quality of ﬁnancial reporting (Zhang, 1999). Highly con-
centrated ownership, which is common in East Asia, can lead to an entrenchment ef-
fect and reduce the rights of minority shareholders. Decisions made by controlling
owners are often not contestable under the region’s weak legal systems or by ineffec-
tive corporate governance mechanisms, such as boards of directors and the market for
corporate control (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; La Porta et al., 1999). Consequently, con-
trolling owners are perceived to report accounting information for self-interested pur-
poses, causing the reported earnings to lose credibility with outside investors in East
Asia (Fan and Wong, 2002). Additionally, involvement by institutional investors will
enhance corporate governance. In Chinese research, return on assets (ROA) is widely
adopted as the prime performance indicator, rather than ROE, as ROE is often manip-
ulated due to the CSRC basing various thresholds on it. Hence, we propose the follow-
ing hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3. Restatements tend to occur more frequently among ﬁrms with poor
governance, more concentrated ownership and poorer ﬁnancial performance.
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þ b7DAþ b8ROAþ b9LEVþ b10Sizei þ ei ð1ÞHere, Restatementi is a dummy variable for ﬁrm i, which takes on the value 1 for restate-
ment ﬁrms and 0 for other listed companies. For the sake of parsimony, we use three vari-
ables as proxies for corporate governance. The ﬁrst variable, SOE, is a dummy variable that
indicates whether a company is an SOE or not. The second variable is the largest share-
holder’s ownership proportion, L_Share. Given that the Chinese government is usually
the largest shareholder of a China-listed ﬁrm, we adopt a third variable, the proportion
of top-10 institutional investors’ share-holding, IIH. Motivating factors for ﬁrm i are rep-
resented by the delisting pressure (LOSS and LOSS_ST) and the need for equity ﬁnancing
(RSI). Corporate performance and ﬁnancial characteristics are represented by discretionary
accruals (DA), ROA and leverage (LEV). Firm size (Size) is our control variable.
It is surprising to observe that the considerable number of restatements that occurred in
China attracted so little attention. We conjecture that it may be because the market is sus-
picious of the credibility of ﬁnancial reports and attaches an almost-independent value to
listed companies. Stock prices in China rarely reﬂect the value of companies, and stock
price changes are rarely an effective reﬂection of the change in available information. Mar-
ket irregularities were not uncommon among ﬂedgling companies during our sample per-
iod and include such practices as insider trading and institutional manipulation of stock
prices (CSRC, 2008). Accounting reporting does not serve as central a role in China’s capital
market as it does in a mature market, and ﬁnancial reports that overstate or poorly state a
Chinese ﬁrm’s true status may have limited effect on the ﬁrm’s stock valuation. Hence, we
arrive at Hypotheses 4 and 5, along with their corollaries:
Hypothesis 4. The stock market fails to punish the poor quality of ﬁnancial reports.
Within this general hypothesis, we construct the three following corollaries.
Hypothesis 4a. The stock market fails to punish the poor quality of ﬁnancial reports
following restatement announcements.
We conjecture that the stock market does not react signiﬁcantly to the announcement of
earnings restatements, which means there is no penalty for restatements. For this hypoth-
esis, we focus on the short-term stock price reaction to the restatement announcements. In
our analysis, we examine various windows up to two weeks before and after the
announcements for any information leakage or delay to the stock market: (10,6),
(5,2), (1,+1), (+2,+5) and (+6,+10) days around the restatement dates (disclosure
dates for enforced restatements and annual report announcement dates for voluntary
restatements). Buy-and-hold market-adjusted cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are
used as the return metric.
Hypothesis 4b. The stock market does not anticipate the poor quality of ﬁnancial reports
before the restatement announcements.
We conduct a long-term event study, which is designed to examine the year preceding
the restatement announcements. The purpose of this hypothesis is to detect whether any
information has been leaked to the stock market, either through insider trading or
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and-hold market-adjusted CARs are used as the return metric.
Failure to reject the ﬁrst two null hypotheses would indicate that the stock market in
China does not punish poor ﬁnancial reporting.
Hypothesis 4c. The stock market does not penalize the poor quality of accounting that is
uncovered by regulatory inspection.
As mentioned earlier, the restatements disclosed according to the regulatory inspection
outcomes represent required restatements. We test whether the market penalizes en-
forced restatements by examining the market reaction around the disclosure date of the
enforced restatements. We examine a window of (6,+6) months around the disclosure
date to allow a reasonable period for routine regulatory procedures before and after the
formal announcement.
Hypothesis 5. The stock market attaches minimal value to ﬁnancial information.
We extend this general hypothesis into two detailed sub-hypotheses, as follows.
Hypothesis 5a. Stock price changes poorly reﬂect revelations of low-quality earnings.
We conduct two sets of returns/earnings tests on both the level of and change in earn-
ings information.CARi ¼ a0 þ a1EPSt þ a2AdjEPSt1 þ ei ð2Þ
CARi ¼ a0 þ a1UnEPSt þ a2Magt1 þ a3Control variablesþ ei ð3ÞIn Eq. (2), CARi is (11,+1) months for a restating company. EPSt is the earnings per
share in the reported year t. AdjEPSt1 is the adjusted earnings for the previous year
t  1; that is, the true earnings per share according to the restatement. We use Eq. (2)
to test whether the market comprehensively reﬂects the value of the company by reacting
to both current annual earnings and past earnings, which can be naïvely adjusted by the
given corrected amount. We conjecture that the market does not react signiﬁcantly, at
least to the adjusted past earnings.
In Eq. (3), CARi is (11,+1) months for a restating company. UnEPSt is the surprise re-
ported year t’s earnings per share, which is measured by the difference between the cur-
rent year’s earnings and the expected earnings, represented by the originally reported
earnings of t  1, given that barely any systematic analyst’s forecasts exist in China so
far. Magt1 is the surprise of the past year, t  1’s, earnings, which is the per-share scaled
restated magnitude. We use Eq. (3) to test whether the market reacts fully to the change in
the accounting information setting, which includes two surprises: the surprise of current
earnings and the surprise of past earnings. We calculate the surprise—or the unexpected
part—of the current earnings as the scaled difference between current earnings and one-
year-prior earnings, taking into account the limited scope of analysts’ forecasting in China.
We represent the surprise of past earnings by the scaled magnitude of the restatement. We
conjecture that, at minimum, the market does not react signiﬁcantly to the surprise of past
earnings.
Hypothesis 5b. The equity market’s reliance on earnings information is minimal.
To test this hypothesis, we conduct the following tests on our sample, using the ERC as a
measure of reliance.
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CARi ¼ aþ b1UEi þ b2UEiTi þ ei ð5ÞEq. (4) is tested separately before and after the sample ﬁrms revealed their poor quality.
Eq. (5) is the pooled test with a dummy variable Ti representing the period after restate-
ment. We expect all bs in both (4) and (5) to be insigniﬁcant.5. Description of restatements in China
5.1. Data selection
Due to the absence of a restatement database, we manually collected our sample from
domestic companies that issued A-shares8 on the Shanghai Stock Exchange and/or the
Shenzhen Stock Exchange. We searched the annual reports of these listed companies and col-
lected information from the Correction of Material Accounting Mistakes section in the foot-
notes. Our sample period runs from January 1, 1999, when the Old Standard for
restatements became effective, to December 31, 2005, just weeks before the announcement
of the 2006 ASBE. As such, the 2005 annual reports were the last annual reports ﬁled by listed
companies under the 2002 ASBE.
Excluding restatements due to mergers and acquisitions, dividend distributions and
changes in accounting policies and accounting estimation, 1092 restatement announce-
ments were identiﬁed due to accounting misrepresentation, irregularities, fraud or errors
during the study period.
Market and accounting data are from the CSMAR database. Institutional investors’ infor-
mation is from the Genius database.
5.2. Data description
Table 2 shows that during 1999–2000, 21 companies each year restated their ﬁnancial
reports, representing approximately 2% of listed companies. However, the number of
restating ﬁrms soared in 2001 and 2002 to 282 and 250, respectively, amounting to
24.96% and 20.85% of public companies. Such a dramatic increase is perceived to be a nat-
ural delay following the adoption of the Old Standard. The number of restating ﬁrms
dropped in subsequent years, but still comprised more than 10% of listed companies.
The reduction may be a direct reﬂection, not only of the restatements of previous years,
but also of the 2001 Rules and the CSRC’s intensive and extensive inspection throughout
all provinces after observing the increase in qualiﬁed auditors’ reports. What is striking
and puzzling is the large proportion of ﬁrms that issued restatements in China. In the Uni-
ted States, although the number of restatements increased during the time frame of our
study, the proportion remained low and steady at around 2% by the end of 2005 (Wu,
2003).
On April 4, 2001, the CSRC issued the Index of Listed Companies’ Industry Classiﬁcation,
which serves as the industry classiﬁcation standard. The information in Table 3 adopts this
standard for the distribution of restatement companies by industry.o types of shares of domestic companies are traded on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges: A-shares and B-
. A-shares are traded in Chinese Yuan and B-shares are traded in US dollars. The stock market is dominated by A-share
g. Only 106 B-shares were traded in January 1999; since the beginning of December 2005 the number has been steady at
Table 2
Yearly restatement characteristics by stock exchange: 1999–2005.
Annual
report
year (t)
Number of
restatement ﬁrms
listed on Shenzhen
Stock Exchange
Number of A-
shares listed on
Shenzhen Stock
Exchange
Percentage
(%)
Number of
restatement ﬁrms
listed on Shanghai
Stock Exchange
Number of A-
shares listed on
Shanghai Stock
Exchange
Percentage
(%)
Total
number of
restatements
Total
number
of A-
Shares
Percentage
(%)
1999 14 450 3.11 7 471 1.49 21 921 2.28
2000 13 451 2.88 8 559 1.43 21 1010 2.08
2001 139 494 28.14 143 636 22.48 282 1130 24.96
2002 112 494 22.67 138 705 19.57 250 1199 20.85
2003 92 491 18.74 106 770 13.77 198 1261 15.70
2004 84 526 15.97 71 827 8.59 155 1353 11.46
2005 76 534 14.23 89 824 10.80 165 1358 12.15
Total 530 562 1092
Note: t + 1 is the year when the annual report for year t is released, in which the restatement of earlier year(s) is disclosed.
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Table 3
Industry distribution.
Number of ﬁrm
observations
Percentage of
total ﬁrms (%)
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing and Hunting A 36 3.30
Mining B 11 1.00
Manufacturing C 610 55.84
Food, Beverage C0 50 4.56
Textile, Apparel, Leather C1 36 3.28
Wood Product C2 3 0.27
Paper, Printing C3 23 2.10
Petroleum, Chemical Product, Rubber, Plastics C4 123 11.22
Electronic Equipment C5 31 2.83
Metal, Nonmetallic Mineral Product C6 93 8.49
Machinery, Equipment, Meter C7 163 14.93
Medicine, Biologic Products C8 77 7.05
Other manufacturing C9 11 1.00
Electricity, Gas, Water Supply D 64 5.84
Construction E 22 2.01
Transport, Storage F 28 2.55
Information, Technology G 61 5.57
Wholesale and Retail Trade H 80 7.30
Real Estate J 38 3.47
Social Services K 29 2.66
Transmission, Culture L 8 0.73
Conglomerate M 105 9.58
Total 1092 100
Note: The classiﬁcation is based on the Index of Industrial Distribution of Listed Companies,
issued by the CSRC on April 3, 2001.
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Machinery, Equipment and Meter, Petroleum and Chemical Products, and Rubber and Plas-
tics making double-digit contributions to the percentage of all restatement ﬁrms.
Following its issuance of the 2001 Rules, the CSRC started to inspect listed companies’
ﬁnancial reports, corporate governance structures and independence from related parties.
The Rules require companies to correct any irregularities found in the inspection and to
disclose them publicly within 30 days of ofﬁcial notice. Because an accounting restatement
is one possible result of the tightened regulatory inspection, such disclosure makes it pos-
sible for us to identify the restatements initiated by the inspection versus those disclosed
by ﬁrms voluntarily. Table 4, Panel A, shows the number of enforced restatements dis-
closed by ﬁrms each year as a result of the inspection ﬁndings, along with those resulting
from voluntary disclosure, from 1999 to 2005.
The enforced restatements comprise only 6% of the sample and are largely concentrated
in the 2001–2003 period. This is a much lower proportion than in the US, where roughly
one-quarter of restatements were instigated by the SEC or other regulators. However, the
number of voluntary restatements also increased in China during those years, which could
be interpreted as a perception by ﬁrms of the serious intent of the 2001 Rules, leading them
to clean up voluntarily rather than be caught by the CSRC. Nevertheless, we do not exclude
the possibility that we may have failed to identify a complete set of enforced restatements
due to the simple, possibly incomplete, disclosure by listed companies in general. From
what we read of companies’ statements, no ﬁrm ever mentioned that the restatement
was suggested by its auditor.
Table 4
Description of restatements, by year of annual report (t).
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Total
Panel A: Enforcement by year
Number of Voluntary Restatements 19 20 265 231 185 146 159 1025
Percentage (%) 90.48 95.24 93.97 92.40 93.43 94.19 96.36 93.86
Number of CSRC-enforced Restatements 2 1 17 19 13 9 6 67
Percentage (%) 9.52 4.76 6.03 7.60 6.57 5.81 3.64 6.14
Total 21 21 282 250 198 155 165 1092
1 2 3 4 5 6 Total number of ﬁrms
Panel B: Frequency of restatements, by number of years restatements occurred
Number of Firms 354 170 67 34 11 1 637
Percentage (%) 55.57 26.69 10.52 5.34 1.73 0.16 100.00
Year t  1 only Years before
t  1 only
Both year t  1 and
previous years
No disclosure Total
Panel C: Distribution of restated years
Number of observations 494 125 451 22 1092
Percentage (%) 46.17 11.68 42.15 2.01 100.00
Reason for classiﬁcation Number of restatements in annual report year (t)
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Total
Panel D: Reasons for restatements by year
1 Mistakes from Subsidiaries 2 7 86 83 85 62 78 403
10% 33% 30% 33% 42% 39% 47% 38%
2 Tax Miscalculation 3 5 87 93 72 57 52 369
14% 24% 31% 37% 36% 36% 32% 34%
3 Costs and Expenses 11 5 80 51 30 26 21 224
52% 24% 28% 20% 15% 17% 13% 20%
4 Depreciation and Provisions 2 3 61 37 36 23 27 189
10% 14% 22% 15% 18% 15% 16% 17%
5 Revenue Recognition 2 1 21 12 11 13 13 73
10% 5% 7% 5% 5% 8% 8% 7%
6 Subsidies Revenue and Tax Refunds 0 1 17 10 7 3 5 43
0 5% 6% 4% 3% 2% 3% 4%
7 Other Mistakes and Misclassiﬁcations 10 12 113 74 56 45 49 359
48% 57% 40% 29% 28% 29% 30% 33%
Downward restatements Upward restatements No impact No disclosure Total
Panel E: Restatement effect on retained earnings
Number of observations 838 181 51 22 1092
Percentage (%) 76.74 16.58 4.67 2.01 100
Obs. Mean Min. 25% Median 75% Max. Std Dev
Panel F: Restated amount (in millions of Chinese Yuan, USD1 = CNY8.2768)
Restated Amount 1068 13.811 815.467 11.147 2.383 0.172 863.188 62.267
Scaled Restated Amount 1063 0.023 7.768 0.008 0.002 0.000 0.158 0.250
(continued on next page)
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Table 4 (continued)
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Total
Panel G: Change of external auditors, by year (t) of annual report
Number of Firms with Auditor Change in year t 6 5 84 20 33 29 33 210
Percentage (%) 29 24 30 8 16 18 20 19
Number of Firms with Auditor Change in year t + 1 6 4 29 21 14 24 19 117
Percentage (%) 29 19 10 9 7 16 12 11
Notes: Panel D: The sum of the percentage numbers could exceed 100% in each year as most restatements involve more than
one reason.
Panel F: Restated amount: the amount of change in retained earnings. If the restatement decreased retained earnings, the
amount is negative; if it increased, the amount is positive.
Scaled restated amount: scaled by total assets at the beginning of year t.
Panel G: We lost 14 observations in year t + 1; they are not included in the percentage calculation. In annual reports, there is
no disclosure of whether the audit ﬁrm quit or was ﬁred.
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1999 to 2005. More than half of the sample companies restated just once during the sam-
ple period, although some restated several times. One ﬁrm, astonishingly, restated six
times in seven years. In all, 494 (46.17%) of the restatements were to correct the prior-
year’s ﬁling,9 and 451 (42.15%) of the restatements were to revise the ﬁlings of both the
prior-year’s ﬁling and that of earlier year(s) (Panel C). However, we cannot discern the num-
ber of years these ﬁrms restated, as such information was not provided in their annual re-
ports. The remainder of the 1092 restatements (147) were to correct mistakes made
before the most recent year. Twenty-two observations did not disclose which year(s) they
restated.
We notice that the reasons for restatements are quite different from those in the United
States. We classify reasons for restatements into eight categories in Table 4, Panel D. Most
restatements involved more than one reason; therefore, the sum of each column exceeds
the annual sample size.
The correction of mistakes in subsidiaries when consolidated ﬁnancial reports are pre-
pared tops our list. This type of restatement is more technical, because parent companies
cannot fully control the subsidiaries’ ﬁnancial reports to the same extent to which they
control their own. The more subsidiaries a parent company has, the more difﬁcult the pro-
cess of management may be and the greater the likelihood of error and subsequent
restatement. Unfortunately, no database contains such information, so we do not have
the opportunity to test this hypothesis. Without detailed disclosure, we are unable to mea-
sure its effect on the magnitude of overall restatements.
Incorrect tax estimation, which is a rarity among US ﬁrms, is frequently observed in Chi-
na. Approximately three-quarters of companies in this category underestimated the tax
paid, which led us to suspect that such underestimation is more intentional than
unintentional.
Misstating, mostly under-misstating, the cost of goods sold or operating expenses is
quite common in China, whereas manipulation of recognized revenue is not a major vehi-
cle: only 7% of restatements involve inﬂating revenue or recognizing revenue earlier (in
the United States, nearly 40% of the restatements are due to the revenue recognition
problem).9 Chinese companies’ ﬁscal year is stipulated to be the same as the calendar year.
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various provision estimates, which is not particularly surprising considering the existence
of many types of provisions in China. In 1999, four types of provisions required estimation:
bad-debt reserve, provision for inventory impairment, provision for short-term invest-
ment impairment and provision for long-term investment impairment. Later in 2001, four
more types of provisions were added: provision for ﬁxed-assets impairment, provision for
intangible-assets impairment, provision for construction-in-progress impairment and pro-
vision for entrusted-loans impairment. The estimation of such provisions demands signif-
icant professional judgment and becomes quite a challenge to accounting professionals
with limited experience10 in a ﬂedging capital market. Meanwhile, various kinds of provi-
sions also offer room for manipulation, which is reﬂected in the CSRC’s 2004 Notice, empha-
sizing that listed companies should not abuse asset impairments, change-of-accounting
estimates or correction-of-material mistakes for the purpose of manipulation.
For many years, a tax refund policy has served as a major incentive to encourage export
in mainland China. In July 2000, the MOF issued the Rules of Accounting Treatments for Tax
Refunds, etc., which clearly demanded the adoption of cash accounting, rather than accrual
accounting, for income from subsidies and tax refunds to prevent companies from manip-
ulating earnings via such vehicles. However, a few listed companies continue to openly
violate the tax refund rules and adopt homemade recognition practices.
Because the simple and general disclosures in one-third of the observations make these
restating companies difﬁcult to categorize, we combine this large fraction into a single cat-
egory that includes unspeciﬁed mistakes, oversights and reclassiﬁcations.
Table 4, Panels E and F, shows that more than three-quarters of the events are related to
an earlier overstatement of retained earnings; the remaining quarter are either underre-
ported or had no effect on retained earnings. The amount of restatements varies widely,
from reducing retained earnings by CNY815 million (USD98.43 million) to increasing re-
tained earnings by CNY863 million (USD104.23 million), with an average decrease of
2.3% of total assets, which is comparable to US percentages.
Table 4, Panel G, shows that almost 20% of the ﬁrm-observations changed auditors dur-
ing the annual report year and 11% during the event year when restatements were dis-
closed. However, with limited disclosure in annual reports, we are unable to distinguish
whether such changes were due to the auditing ﬁrm leaving the employment of the client
company voluntarily or under duress.6. Empirical analysis
6.1. Firm characteristics and potential motivations
We now analyze the characteristics of our sample and seek the potential motivations for
these companies to ﬁle incorrect ﬁnancial reports.
Table 5, Panel A, reveals that restatement ﬁrms have slightly lower mean total assets
compared with other listed companies, but most observations fall within the comparable
size range.
Table 5, Panel B, compares various company characteristics in the restated year (year
t  1) of the restatement sample to the control sample. As a control, we used the full set
10 China only embarked on the development of the CPA profession in the early 1980s. The Chinese Institute of Certiﬁed Public
Accountants (CICPA) was established in November 1988, and the ﬁrst CPA exam was conducted in 1991.
Table 5
Restatement ﬁrm characteristics.
Obs. Mean Min. 25% Median 75% Max. Std Dev
Panel A: Firm size (in millions of Chinese Yuan)
Restatement Firm Size 1086 1994.15 42.01 725.51 1217.12 2315.29 31426.19 2471.01
Firm size of all A-share Companies 8242 2611.84 21.51 748.89 1270.47 2413.29 520,572 11,635
Mean Median
Restatement
sample N = 911
Control sample
N = 3058
t-Stat Restatement
sample N = 911
Control sample
N = 3058
Wilcoxon
Z-stat
Panel B: Comparison between the restatement sample and control sample
E/P 0.000 0.022 7.39*** 0.012 0.022 13.60***
B/P 0.502 0.558 7.46*** 0.498 0.562 7.43***
Income 0.010 0.046 9.61*** 0.027 0.050 13.08***
OpInc 0.009 0.043 10.33*** 0.022 0.045 13.60***
EPS 0.055 0.198 7.58*** 0.119 0.210 13.92***
EG 0.013 0.002 2.12** 0.003 0.002 7.84***
LEV 0.552 0.440 7.35*** 0.506 0.429 10.87***
UI 0.005 0.006 3.32*** 0.002 0.003 3.03***
Age 5.850 5.290 5.48*** 6.000 5.000 6.31***
L_Share 40.450 45.970 8.60*** 37.920 46.230 8.73***
SOE 0.670 0.650 0.87 1.000 1.000 0.87
II 0.368 0.436 3.70*** 0.000 0.000 3.70***
IIH 0.005 0.008 5.07*** 0.000 0.000 4.55***
TA 0.035 0.019 3.43*** 0.022 0.014 3.70***
DA 0.016 0.002 3.04*** 0.002 0.004 3.34***
ROA 0.001 0.027 5.07*** 0.022 0.037 11.27***
CROA 0.007 0.033 5.92*** 0.022 0.039 9.94***
ROE 0.019 0.021 2.02** 0.048 0.066 9.14***
LOSS_ST 0.068 0.022 5.62*** 0.000 0.000 7.27***
LOSS 0.162 0.081 6.15*** 0.000 0.000 7.17***
RSI 0.290 0.303 0.76 0.000 0.000 0.76
Notes: Panel A: Firm size: the total assets at the end of year t.
Firm size of all A-share companies: the size of A-share listed companies across the board from 1999 to 2005.
Panel B: All are measured at the end of year t  1, the restated year).
E/P: Fiscal Operating Earnings/Market Capitalization.
B/P: Book Value/Market Capitalization.
Income: Net income before Extraordinary Items/mean Total Assets.
OpInc: Operating Income/mean Total Assets.
EPS: Earnings per share.
EG: Earnings Growth, (Net Incomet1  Net Incomet2)/Total Assets.
LEV: Leverage, Total Debt/Stockholders’ Equity.
UI: Below-the-line items, (income from investment + non-operating income + subsidies)/Total Assets.
Age: The number of years ﬁrms have been listed on the stock exchange.
L_Share: The percentage stock holding by the largest stakeholder.
SOE: Dummy variable. State = 1 if a state-owned enterprise, and 0 otherwise.
II: Institutional investor among top 10 shareholders. If there is an institutional investor, II = 1, and 0 otherwise.
IIH: Institutional investor’s holding proportion among top 10 shareholders.
TA: Total accruals = (Operating Income  Cash Flow from Operation)/Total Assets.
DA: Discretionary accruals, calculated with modiﬁed Jones Model.
ROA: Return on Assets = (EBIT  Tax)/Total Assets.
CROA: Return of Operating Income on Assets.
ROE: Return on Equity = Net Income/Shareholders’ Equity.
LOSS: Dummy variable. LOSS = 1 when there was a loss in year t  1, and 0 otherwise.
LOSS_ST: Dummy variable. LOSS_ST = 1 when there was a loss in both years t  1 and t  2, and 0 otherwise.
RSI: Dummy variable. RSI = 1 if rights or secondary issuance occurred in t  1, t  2, or t  3, and 0 otherwise.
⁄Statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% level for two-tailed tests.
** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% level for two-tailed tests.
*** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level for two-tailed tests.
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tion to calculate the results. The reason for such a ‘‘naïve’’ matching method is the rela-
tively small number of companies listed on either the Shanghai or Shenzhen stock
exchanges by the end of 2005 (just over 1300 in all). If we adopted the conventional meth-
od of matching by industry and ﬁrm size among the non-restatement companies, then
there would be very few comparable companies and we would be unable to construct
an effective matched sample.
Table 5, Panel B, shows that the restatement companies generally have lower valuations,
poorer performance, higher leverage and greater losses compared with the control sample.
The largest shareholders of the sample ﬁrms hold a lower proportion of shares than those
of the control sample. There is no signiﬁcant difference between the two samples in terms
of the number of SOEs.
Notably, we observe that restatement ﬁrms have been listed signiﬁcantly longer on the
stock exchange, with a mean age of almost 6 years compared with 5.29 years for control
ﬁrms. Their ROA, core ROA and ROE are all signiﬁcantly lower than those of the control
sample. Meanwhile, the benchmark for determining whether a ﬁrm can offer rights or a
secondary issue, ROE, is far from the 10% threshold. The mean ROE is slightly below 0. This
result contradicts our expectation in Hypothesis 1. Restatement companies have a higher
frequency of single-year losses and consecutive losses, consistent with our expectation in
Hypothesis 2. Although Table 5, Panel B, shows that approximately 29.6% of the sample
had rights or secondary issuances in the two years prior to and in the most-recent restated
year, combining all of the results, we would not claim that companies’ manipulation dur-
ing the restated year is aimed principally at achieving equity ﬁnancing needs, but is more
likely to be associated with a struggle against poor performance and delisting pressures.
Consistent with the China research literature, we ﬁnd that both total accruals and discre-
tionary accruals are generally negative during the most recent restated year. Perplexingly,
however, we also observe that both types of accruals in the test sample are signiﬁcantly
lower than in the control sample. No explanation for this ﬁnding comes to mind.6.2. Determinants of restatements
Here, we examine whether the company characteristics during the corrected year (t  1)
can collectively explain the restatement phenomenon in China. These characteristics may
offer some guidance to regulators on which aspects to explore when seeking out poor-
quality ﬁrms.
Table 6 provides the Pearson correlations for all of the potential test variables. The per-
formance variables are highly correlated with one another. We leave ROE in the table, as it
is an important threshold in China’s capital market. However, ROE is widely manipulated
in the Chinese market due to its role as a threshold. We omit it from our ofﬁcial empirical
model (Eq. (2)) and adopt only ROA in the ﬁnal test. We similarly omit earnings growth
from our ofﬁcial empirical tests. Naturally, ROA is highly correlated with LOSS, LOSS_ST
and LEV, which we will control for in the regressions.
Table 7 examines the company characteristics and incentives that collectively lead to a
restatement. The ﬁnal regression is conducted on the complete sample and includes all
variables. It shows that companies with lower proﬁtability, higher leverage, lower hold-
ings by institutional investors, lower ownership concentration and SOEs are more likely
to be restatement ﬁrms. Because the incentive variables for delisting pressure, LOSS and
Table 6
Pearson correlations.
R DA ROA ROE EG LOSS-ST LOSS LEV L_Share SOE RSI Size
R 1
DA 0.048*** 1
ROA 0.086*** 0.679*** 1
ROE 0.027* 0.356*** 0.569*** 1
EG 0.017 0.322*** 0.453*** 0.377*** 1
LOSS_ST 0.080*** 0.382*** 0.472*** 0.291*** 0.092*** 1
LOSS 0.114*** 0.354*** 0.498*** 0.332*** 0.257*** 0.533*** 1
LEV 0.138*** 0.150*** 0.348*** 0.195*** 0.023 0.172*** 0.219*** 1
L_Share 0.135*** 0.058*** 0.121*** 0.085*** 0.003 0.079*** 0.128*** 0.134 1
SOE 0.014 0.000 0.030* 0.024 0.007 0.009 0.032** 0.013 0.268*** 1
RSI 0.012 0.093*** 0.072*** 0.045*** 0.029* 0.084*** 0.115*** 0.108*** 0.001 0.038** 1
Size 0.059*** 0.046*** 0.146*** 0.077*** 0.002 0.140 0.173*** 0.171*** 0.213*** 0.142*** 0.143*** 1
IIH 0.069*** 0.062*** 0.108*** 0.048*** 0.026 0.062*** 0.115*** 0.043*** 0.011 0.025 0.030* 0.171***
Notes: See Table 5 notes for variable deﬁnitions.
R: A dummy variable. R = 1 if restatement, otherwise 0 for all listed companies.
* Statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
*** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
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Table 7
Determinants of restatements.
Dependent Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
(predicted sign) Coefﬁcient Pr > Chi Coefﬁcient Pr > Chi Coefﬁcient Pr > Chi Coefﬁcient Pr > Chi Coefﬁcient Pr > Chi Coefﬁcient Pr > Chi
Intercept 0.208 0.829 0.442 0.635 0.196 0.833 0.151 0.876 0.178 0.854 0.098 0.919
SOE (+) 0.320 0.000 0.296 0.001 0.293 0.000 0.321 0.000 0.322 0.000 0.322 0.000
L_Share (+) 0.017 <.000 0.019 <.000 0.019 <.000 0.017 <.000 0.016 <.000 0.017 <.000
IIH () 8.440 0.003 9.252 0.001 9.873 0.000 7.968 0.005 7.926 0.004 7.916 0.005
LOSS (+) 0.365 0.013 0.534 <.000 0.165 0.354
LOSS_ST(+) 0.053 0.839 0.469 0.039 0.107 0.686 0.161 0.549
RSI (+) 0.055 0.534 0.038 0.665 0.057 0.509 0.044 0.624 0.043 0.629 0.047 0.600
DA (+) 0.142 0.747 0.218 0.602 0.270 0.523 0.221 0.641 0.205 0.667 0.203 0.183
ROA () 0.501 0.201 0.843 0.045 2.031 0.002 2.142 0.002 1.714 0.039
LEV (+) 1.579 <.000 1.447 <.000 1.449 <.000 1.452 <.000
Size (?) 0.078 0.105 0.006 0.896 0.014 0.762 0.069 0.154 0.069 0.147 0.068 0.163
Chi-square 162.63 130.91 120.07 165.98 166.15 166.99
Number of observations 3928
Notes: All variables are for year t  1.
Bold numbers indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
See Table 5 for variable deﬁnitions.
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188 X. Wang, M. Wu / China Journal of Accounting Research 4 (2011) 167–196LOSS_ST, are highly positively correlated with the performance variables, ROA and lever-
age, we test the model alternatively with and without ROA or LEV. The results imply that
the delisting pressure is an incentive to manipulate earlier years’ earnings and contributes
to later restatement. All tests fail to demonstrate that ﬁrms’ ﬁnancing needs serve as an
incentive for manipulation in our sample.
We are surprised to ﬁnd that our test produces the opposite sign from that expected for
ownership concentration; that is, the lower the proportion of the largest shareholder’s
stake, or the lower the ownership concentration, the higher the probability that a listed
company will restate. We interpret this result as follows: in China, the ‘‘shell’’ of a listed
company is a very valuable and limited resource due to the slow CSRC approval process.
When a company faces proﬁtability stress or potential losses, the largest shareholder will
pump proﬁts into the company by arranging, for example, related-party transactions, a
very common practice in China. However, companies with lower ownership concentration
will not beneﬁt from their largest shareholders when experiencing the same pressure, as
the largest shareholders have insufﬁcient incentive to rescue the ailing company. Such
companies then either face being delisted, or resort to accounting manipulation, which
is later reversed through restatement. Such conjecture is supported by the signiﬁcant neg-
ative correlation between ownership concentration and the delisting pressure variables,
LOSS and LOSS_ST.
Our control variable of ﬁrm size is negatively but not signiﬁcantly related to
restatements.
We also conduct extra tests within subsamples, limiting the observations to downward
restatements and core earnings related to restatements. The results, which we do not in-
clude in the tables, are consistent with our primary tests.
Combining all factors, one can understand why a large SOE, whose largest shareholder is
the government, will remain above the ﬁnancial fray and avoid the need to restate: it is
simply because the government will not let that happen.Table 8
Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) around restatement announcements. Full sample 1999–2005.
Period N Mean Median Std Dev t-Stats P-value Signed rank P-value
Panel A: Short-term CAR with available return data
Day (10,6) 1088 0.0034 0.0058 0.0572 0.1361 <.0001
Day (5,2) 1087 0.0039 0.0051 0.0468 0.0124 0.0009
Day (1,+1) 1087 0.0001 0.0048 0.0573 0.7802 0.0003
Day (+2,+5) 1087 0.0008 0.0031 0.0537 0.4227 0.3721
Day (+6,+10) 1085 0.0037 0.0002 0.0558 0.0361 0.1314
Panel B: Long window—periods leading up to the announcement
Day (251,211) 1007 0.0104 0.0126 0.1053 0.0024 0.0011
Day (210,170) 1012 0.0107 0.0147 0.1049 0.0013 <.0001
Day (169,128) 1020 0.0057 0.0113 0.1183 0.1275 0.0041
Day (127,86) 1023 0.0114 0.0176 0.1189 0.0022 <.0001
Day (85,44) 1030 0.0162 0.0164 0.1188 <.0001 <.0001
Day (43,22) 1089 0.0048 0.0017 0.0821 0.0714 0.4887
Day (21,11) 1089 0.0018 0.0059 0.0713 0.3442 0.0001
Notes: Signiﬁcance levels are for two-tailed tests. A market-adjusted returns model is adopted. We obtained our data from
the CSMAR database. Individual stock’s daily abnormal return is calculated as ARit = Rit  Rmt. Rmt is the market return,
represented by the A-share composite index daily return. Sample daily abnormal returns are calculated as ARt ¼ 1N
PN
i ARit .
Portfolio CARs are calculated as CARBE ¼
PE
t¼BARt . B and E, respectively, represent the beginning and ending days around
event day 0.
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Even though ﬁnancial restatements in China have become a prevailing phenomenon, it
remains largely below the radar, which seems perplexing. We now test Hypothesis 4 and
offer explanations.
Following most research on restatements in the US, we conduct event tests and let their
results tell the story. Table 8, Panel A, shows the short-term CARs for our restatement
sample. Contrary to the strikingly negative results from US data (CARs of approximately
11%), China’s stock market reacts very weakly, barely registering any reaction to restate-
ment announcements. The mean CAR values for the 3-day period around the announce-
ment (1,+1) are not signiﬁcant, although the median CARs are signiﬁcant, with a
market reaction of 0.48%. During the week ahead of the annual report release, however,
the market reacts in a signiﬁcantly negative way, a drop of roughly half of one percent.
These results show that investors in China’s stock market fail to punish the poor quality
of ﬁnancial reports following restatement announcements as severely as investors in the
US stock market.
Nevertheless, investors may perceive such poor-quality accounting ahead of the restate-
ments due to possible information leakage. Hence, we look back over a longer period prior
to the release of the annual report and ﬁnd that the results are quite mixed. We divide the
timeframe into several periods for examination. We ﬁnd there is a slight decline one year
before the release of the report. However, the CARs of some timeframes are signiﬁcantly
negative, whereas others are not. Some are signiﬁcant for the median, but not the mean.
Overall, the magnitude is limited and the mixed results do not permit us to reject Hypoth-
esis 5, which states that investors do not anticipate the poor quality of ﬁnancial reports.
Long-term tests up to six months before the restatement announcements are presented
in Table 9, Panel C; these fail to reveal a post-announcement drift, which implies that the
poor quality of ﬁnancial reports negates the potential for the market to digest the informa-
tion and eventually react in a rational, albeit delayed, fashion.Table 9
Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) around restatement announcements. CSRC-enforced subsample 1999–
2005.
Period N Mean Median Std Dev t-Stats P-value Signed rank P-value
Panel A: Short-term CAR with available return data
Day (10,6) 67 0.006 0.000 0.047 0.289 0.666
Day (5,2) 67 0.001 0.004 0.039 0.776 0.384
Day (1,+1) 67 0.011 0.010 0.042 0.028 0.014
Day (+2,+5) 67 0.007 0.004 0.055 0.273 0.482
Day (+6,+10) 67 0.008 0.000 0.058 0.237 0.955
Day (+11,+21) 67 0.013 0.012 0.074 0.134 0.085
Panel B: Long window—periods leading up to the announcement
Day (251,211) 63 0.008 0.012 0.067 0.231 0.024
Day (210,170) 64 0.009 0.017 0.062 0.189 0.018
Day (169,128) 65 0.005 0.010 0.110 0.127 0.026
Day (127,86) 67 0.002 0.013 0.098 0.767 0.000
Day (85,44) 67 0.014 0.015 0.109 0.000 0.000
Day (43,22) 67 0.003 0.001 0.076 0.712 0.879
Day (21,11) 67 0.009 0.018 0.059 0.177 0.017
Notes: Refer to those for Table 8.
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of accounting uncovered by the CSRC’s inspection following restatement announcements.
In Table 10, Panel A, the CARs of1% are signiﬁcant both for the mean and the median only
for the (1,+1) period around the event date. Usually, the regulatory inspection will take a
few months to conclude, leading us to look back over a longer period preceding the CSRC’s
decision. During the six months preceding the restatement in Table 10, Panel B, the CAR
values (mean 1.4%, median 1.5%) are signiﬁcant only between the fourth month and
the second month. The CARs from the remaining time frames are mostly negative and
insigniﬁcant.
Overall, the stock market reaction offers an ambiguous and different picture of restate-
ments from that of the US stock market. We can claim that the stock market in China
either fails to punish poor ﬁnancial reporting or does not punish it enough.6.4. Usefulness of accounting information
Puzzled by the market’s failure to react to the restatement phenomenon, we suspect
that investors may attach a different value to accounting information in China, and thus
may partially or completely ignore such information. Restatements are disclosed in ﬁrms’
annual reports, which also offer a great deal of other information, mainly relating to the
current reported year. Buried within, the revealing of restatements may simply be missed
by investors. Hence, we test two dimensions of the return/earnings relationship: the level
of and the change in information.
Table 11, Panel A, shows how the stock market reacts to the current year’s earnings and
the past year’s corrected earnings. We obtain the latter by adding the restated amount
back onto the originally reported earnings for those sample ﬁrms that restate at least
the previous year’s results. The results show that the market does respond to accounting
information: its reaction is clearly and signiﬁcantly related to the current year’s earnings.
However, it ignores the corrected past year’s earnings, which is also new information re-Table 10
Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) around restatement announcements. Subsample of core earnings
reasons 1999–2005.
Period N Mean Median Std Dev t-stats P-value Signed rank P-value
Panel A: Short-term CAR with available return data
Day (10,6) 376 0.004 0.005 0.054 0.169 0.029
Day (5,2) 375 0.003 0.005 0.053 0.214 0.089
Day (1,1) 375 0.004 0.006 0.057 0.164 0.004
Day (+2,+5) 374 0.003 0.001 0.063 0.367 0.765
Day (+6,+10) 372 0.005 0.000 0.061 0.131 0.104
Day (+11,+21) 369 0.007 0.004 0.075 0.083 0.156
Panel B: Long window—periods leading up to the announcement
Day (251,211) 362 0.000 0.002 0.046 0.432 0.284
Day (210,170) 362 0.011 0.015 0.107 0.061 0.019
Day (169,128) 365 0.014 0.019 0.125 0.032 0.011
Day (127,86) 365 0.020 0.036 0.187 0.038 0.000
Day (85,44) 364 0.026 0.025 0.117 <0.000 <0.000
Day (43,22) 376 0.006 0.002 0.088 0.216 0.592
Day (21,11) 376 0.001 0.005 0.087 0.898 0.205
Notes: Refer to those for Table 8.
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the equity market. Investors seem to pay attention, naïvely, only to the current year’s
accounting information while ignoring information about the past.
Table 11, Panel B, presents the test results on the market reaction to the change in infor-
mation. Such change has two components in our tests: the change in the current year’s
earnings, proxied by unexpected earnings, and the change in past earnings, represented
by the magnitude of the restatement. We use a dummy variable, Loss, to control for the
major characteristics of the current year’s earnings, along with variables describing the
restatement characteristics, and ﬁnd the marginal signiﬁcance of the magnitude disap-Table 11
Usefulness of earnings information.
CARi = a0 + a1EPSt + a2AdjEPSt1 + e
Coefﬁcient t-Stat
Panel A: Returns on earnings
Intercept 0.007 0.98
EPSt 0.142 9.23
AdjEPS 0.010 0.93
R2 9.18%
F value 43.33
Number of observations 838
CARi Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Coefﬁcient t-Stat Coefﬁcient t-Stat Coefﬁcient t-Stat Coefﬁcient t-Stat
Panel B: Returns on earnings surprises
Intercept 0.006 0.86 0.066 0.70 0.061 0.65 0.079 0.83
Un_EPS 0.051 4.94 0.030 2.82 0.031 2.87 0.030 2.83
Magnitude 0.051 1.87 0.027 0.98 0.031 1.12 0.027 0.95
Loss 0.105 5.82 0.107 5.92 0.103 5.70
CSRC 0.017 0.61 0.017 0.62 0.015 0.54
Tax 0.013 0.86
Subsidiary 0.011 0.75
Revenue 0.035 1.23
Core 0.006 0.41 0.006 0.41
Firm_Size 0.007 0.89 0.007 0.84 0.008 1.01
R2 2.57% 5.73% 5.86% 5.70%
F value 14.38 11.02 11.26 8.48
Number of
observations
1015 989 989 989
Notes: CARi: Cumulative abnormal returns of (5,+1) months around the restatement event date.
EPSt: EPS for year t.
AdjEPSt1: True EPS for year t  1, naively adjusted by restated amount.
Un_EPS: Unexpected earnings per share (EPS): the reported EPS subtracts’ expected EPS, which is last year’s
EPS.
Magnitude: Restated amount per share.
Loss: A dummy variable. Loss = 1 if the company experienced a loss in year t, and 0 otherwise.
CSRC: A dummy variable. CSRC = 1 if the restatement is CSRC-enforced, and 0 otherwise.
Tax: A dummy variable. Tax = 1 if the restatement is tax related, and 0 otherwise.
Subsidiary: A dummy variable. Subsidiary = 1 if the restatement is a mistake from a subsidiary, and 0
otherwise.
Revenue: A dummy variable. Revenue = 1 if the restatement is revenue recognition related, and 0 otherwise.
Core: A dummy variable. Core = 1 if the restatement reason(s) is/are related to revenue, cost & operating
expenses, and/or depreciation and provision, and 0 otherwise.
Firm size: The log form of total ﬁrm assets.
Table 12
Earnings credibility  earnings response coefﬁcients.
CARi ¼ aþ bUEi þ ei (4)
CARi ¼ aþ b1UEi þ b2UEiTi þ ei (5)
t  1 t Pooled
Coefﬁcient t-Stat Coefﬁcient t-Stat Coefﬁcient t-Stat
Intercept 0.001 0.14 0.058 5.25 0.028 4.14
UE 0.376 8.21 0.244 5.71 0.392 7.11
UE  T 0.136 2.04
F value 67.44 32.61 48.63
Adj R2 0.072 0.036 0.053
Number of observations 857 857 1715
Notes: CARi: Cumulative returns for (11,+1) months around annual report date.
UEi: Unexpected earnings of year i: the difference between the reported earnings and the expected earnings, i.e., the prior-
year’s earnings, scaled by the stock price of the day before the announcement date.
Ti: Dummy variable. T = 1 if UEi is for year t, and T = 0 if UEi is for year t  1.
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captured signiﬁcantly by investors, whereas the change in the previous year’s earnings
information via outright admission of poor-quality earnings for the previous period is
completely ignored. These results are consistent with those in Table 11, Panel A.
Next, we test the credibility of accounting information to investors using annual data.
The dependent variable is unexpected annual earnings, which we compute by subtracting
the prior year’s earnings per share from the current year’s earnings per share. The indepen-
dent variable is the corresponding CAR for (11,+1) months around the annual report
date. As demonstrated in Table 12, before the restatement, the ERC of b1 is signiﬁcantly
positive (0.356), and after the restatement it drops to 0.231. The drop is signiﬁcantly neg-
ative at the 10% level, as shown by b2 = 0.127 for dummy  UE in the pooled sample. This
can be interpreted as the market’s acknowledgement that revealing poor accounting qual-
ity is bad news, although the ERCs in China are low. Our tests show that they are below 0.4,
which is much lower than in the United States, where they are above 1. Such a contrast
implies that investors in China generally attach much lower value to accounting
information.
6.5. Robustness tests
We also conduct robustness tests by taking out observations due to miscalculations, ty-
pos and postings by mistake due to human error. All statistical results remain consistent
with earlier tests.11 The CARs for the year-long window leading up to the annual report
announcement increase slightly from around 6% to around 10%, which again indicates
that investors do not punish poor ﬁnancial reporting as much as they should.7. Conclusion
China’s capital market has been rapidly improving since the end of the 1970s, however it
has yet to mature and become as efﬁcient as developed markets. Our accounting-based re-
search yields a variety of test results that collectively indicate that low-quality accounting11 We do not list these tables in the paper. They are available upon request.
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role in investment behavior and philosophy that it does in mature markets.
Various aspects of capital markets can offer insights into our test results on market reac-
tion. We now examine these in turn.
Short-selling, an important stock market mechanism, was not available either directly or
indirectly to investors during our sample period.12 Investors’ inability to sell short deters a
stock’s ability to approach an efﬁcient price in a timely manner.
The investor structure is disproportionate relative to that in mature markets. The scale
of institutional investors is small. Individual investors, especially medium and small inves-
tors, account for a signiﬁcant proportion of trading accounts and trading turnover. Short-
term speculation dominates long-term investment (CSRC, 2008). Our test results imply
that accounting information has yet to play a signiﬁcant role in investment behavior
and philosophy. Developing institutional investment and improving investors’ education
are suggested to be crucial tasks for the government and regulators.
We call for effective regulation on the disclosure of ﬁnancial reporting. Poor disclosure
causes market inefﬁciency in China. Throughout our research, our attention was caught by
the limited amount of information disclosed. For example, when a restatement involves
more than one year, there is no indication of the number of prior years that it affects,
and when there is more than one reason for restatement, there is no guidance on the rel-
ative weight of the reasons. Although the 2004 Notice deﬁned the need for timely and sep-
arate disclosure of signiﬁcant events, including restatements, the speciﬁcation is not
reliably followed.
We also call for more vigorous regulatory and administrative enforcement. The CSRC
does not have the power to determine appropriate monetary penalties for regulation-vio-
lating corporate behavior. The executor of the justice system, the court, is legally equipped
with the power to decide the size of monetary penalties, based on the Law of the People’s
Republic of China on Administrative Penalty13 and the Securities Law of the People’s Repub-
lic of China.14 Nevertheless, the penalty’s cap is so low—CNY 600,00015—that it cannot act as
a real ﬁnancial deterrent to violating companies. Alternative punishments come from the
regulatory body of the CSRC, which could either exert pressure on a listed company’s future
application for rights or secondary issuances, or publicly criticize violating companies on the
stock exchange. Disallowing reﬁnancing would be a substantial discouragement to a com-
pany with ﬁnancing needs. However, as our tests show, the ﬁnancial status of companies
that issue restatements generally forbids them from effectively applying for equity ﬁnancing.
Financing needs may not even appear in their timetable because survival has a higher prior-
ity than ﬁnancing. As for the option of public criticism, it does not inﬂict much real imme-12 Investors still cannot short-sell stocks directly, but can do so via put options on a limited number of companies. The ﬁrst
(call) option in China was of Baosteel Co., Ltd., listed and traded on the Shanghai Stock Exchange on August 22, 2005, whereas
the ﬁrst put option was not issued until May 30, 2006, on China Kweichow Maotai Distillery Co., Ltd. By the end of 2007, there
were only 27 options issued in total, 21 of which had already expired with six still outstanding; 10 of the 27 were put options.
(Shanghai Stock Exchange: http://www.sse.com.cn)
13 The Law was passed at the fourth Session of the Eighth National People’s Congress and promulgated by Order No. 63 of the
President of the People’s Republic of China on March 17, 1996. It became effective on October 1, 1996.
14 The Securities Law was passed at the sixth Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Ninth National People’s Congress on
December 29, 1998, revised at the 18th Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Tenth National People’s Congress of the
People’s Republic of China on October 27, 2005, according to the Decision on Revising the Securities Law of the People’s Republic
of China made at the 11th meeting of the Standing Committee of the Tenth People’s Congress on August 28, 2004.
15 CNY600,000  USD72,464 during our sample period.
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they need to be enforced and substantiated.
Class action lawsuits, a commonly practiced US legal vehicle to inﬂict damage, are a rar-
ity in China. First, from our tests on stock market reaction, a company that reveals mis-
takes in previously released ﬁnancial reports incurs little if any damage. In fact, there is
hardly any damage to seek. Second, although there is damage from the decline in the indi-
vidual stock price, China’s courts simply will not accept damage cases as, to the courts,
such cases are not as important as numerous other civil lawsuits. Implicitly, such reality
encourages companies to report poor-quality ﬁnancial statements because later discovery
and restatement will be virtually costless. The introduction of a legal procedure for pro-
cessing cases, along with a punitive legal system to deal with violations of accounting
rules, should provide a valuable complement to the current structure of China’s capital
market.
China’s credit market falls far behind the mature markets worldwide. The scale of the
credit market, especially the corporate bond market, is quite small16 (CBRC, 2006). Bank
loans are the major form of corporate debt. The process of introducing a free lending rate into
the market from the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) offers a few crucial implications for the
debt capital market. As with reforms in many other aspects of the economy, the introduction
of a free lending rate is also a gradual process. The ﬂoating range of ﬁnancial institutions’
lending interest rate is completely regulated by the PBOC. Before January 1, 2004, the ceiling
was capped at 10% above the base rate.17 It was relaxed to 70% for the next nine months be-
fore being totally freed. Under the regulated lending system, the rate a company received did
not necessarily reﬂect the rate it should have received according to the company’s overall
risk–risk that includes accounting quality as a crucial component. Speciﬁcally, poor account-
ing quality was not penalized fairly with an appropriately higher lending rate. The low addi-
tional cost from loan borrowings cannot effectively prevent companies from providing low-
quality ﬁnancial reports. Unfortunately, we are unable to test this hypothesis directly, be-
cause interest expense is combined with other operating expenses in all existing databases.
During most of our sample period, commercial banks did not have sufﬁcient incentive to dis-
tinguish clearly among companies with different credit levels until the big four state banks
and top-tier banks were listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. This began only in mid-
2005 after shaking off a signiﬁcant amount of non-performing loans, following international
banking rules and accounting standards, and offering executive stock option plans.
From examining accounting restatements in our sample of China’s A-share listings, we
conclude that companies with weak proﬁtability, a state-controlled shareholder and dif-
fused ownership tend to report poor ﬁnancial statements and later restate. In an emerging
market such as China’s, however, we ﬁnd that the stock market does not react signiﬁcantly
to restatements forced by low-quality accounting. The stock market is only able to digest
partial accounting information and accounting credibility is low. These ﬁndings, together
with the inefﬁcient debt market, weak regulatory system and legal punitive system dis-
cussed above, underscore why restatements were such a widespread phenomenon during
our sample period. We show that in China, accounting credibility has lower value and an16 By the end of 2006, the total value of the credit market was 28.7% of GDP, compared to 188% in the United States. The value
of corporate bonds was 1.44% of GDP versus 125.72% in the United States.
17 In 1998, the ceiling was increased to 20% above the base rate for small enterprises, and to 30% for medium and small
enterprises in 1999. The ﬂoor lending rate has remained steady at 10% below the base rate. For example, on January 1, 2004, the
PBOC’s one-year base lending rate was 5.31%; the range of lending rates would therefore be 4.78–9.03%.
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United States, because the market mechanism fails to deter ﬁrms’ misstatement behavior.
We advocate the reinforcement of market regulation and supervision, strengthening of the
legal system, further improvement of free-market mechanisms and continuous investor
education in China’s capital markets.
We believe our study to be very timely, given that it echoes the recent spirit and reforms
of the Chinese government and regulators. The release of the Opinions of the State Council
on Promoting the Reform, Opening and Steady Growth of Capital Markets (the Opinions) on
January 31, 2004, sees the role of capital markets as sovereign and strategic for national
economic development. The CSRC concurrently implemented a series of reforms to reﬁne
market infrastructure and functionality—reforms that include improving the quality of
listed companies and facilitating institutional investors’ entrance into the capital market.18
Interestingly, we ﬁnd that our sample size starts to decrease during the ﬁnal two to three
years of our 1999–2005 sample period. This coincides with: (1) the CSRC’s adoption of a
decentralized supervision system in 2004, a measure intended to improve the quality of
listed companies and whose regulatory efﬁciency was immediately evident (CSRC, 2008);
(2) the CSRC’s Rule 19, introduced at the end of 2003, and the 2004 Notice on Further Improv-
ing Financial Information Disclosure of Listed Companies; (3) the CBRC’s introduction of a free
lending-rate system in 2004; and (4) the listing of big banks in Hong Kong since 2005, fol-
lowing various international industry standards. Accounting quality is improving, in terms
of the decreasing number of ﬁrm restatements, as a result of regulatory efforts and a more
extensive free-market mechanism. We also expect that when China’s capital market achieves
maturity in the near future, investors’ behavior will change commensurately towards that of
investors in mature markets. Speciﬁcally, in relation to our studied cases, investors will effec-
tively differentiate bad accounting quality from good practices.
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